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THE FAILURE OF THE ADA - ACHIEVING PARITY
WITH RESPECT TO MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH
CARE COVERAGE IN THE PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT REALM
Pamela Signorello*
The business people have not been exposed to all of
this legal terminology. You tell them 'mentally ill' and
their word, and I'm going to say it in Spanish, is 'loco',
crazy. 'We don't hire a loco. We don't hire a crazy
person.' Any kind - it doesn't matter if it is a manic-
depressive - the word there is loco. 'We've got a loco
crazy working with us.' It is sad but that is the way it
is.
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was enacted to "ad-
dress the problem of discrimination against [disabled individuals] in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, educa-
tion, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting and access to public services."'2 The Act should
have provided a "clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elim-
ination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life; to provide enforceable standards addressing discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities .... -"3 The values that the ADA
encompasses, such as "equal protection under the law, individual em-
powerment, freedom of association, [and] economic opportunity," are of
crucial significance to all Americans. 4 According to a "Questions and
Answers" pamphlet released by the Equal Employment Opportunity
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 2001, currently employed as a litigation associate in Bos-
ton, Mass.
I LAURA MANCUSO, PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TURNING POLICY INTO PRACTICE 11 (1995) (emphasis
added) (quoting Carlos Perez, a consumer advocate and businessman from South Texas).
2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, 395 LAB. LAW
REP. (CCH) 1 10, at 9 (July 31, 1990).
3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ENSURING
EQUAL ACCESS TO THE AMERICAN DREAM 6 (1995).
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Commission ("EEOC") and the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division, the ADA "guarantees equal opportunity" for disabled individu-
als in fundamental areas of life like " public accommodations, employ-
ment, transportation, state and local government resources, and
telecommunication." 5 This note challenges the validity of that statement,
specifically as it applies to the disparity between mental and physical
health care benefits afforded employees in the private employment
realm.
Part II provides important background on the ADA, including its
origin and professed purpose as it relates to insurance coverage, and how
the statute defines and how one can establish disability and discrimina-
tion. Part III offers a survey of the federal courts of appeals' respective
rulings on whether the ADA mandates parity of coverage in the private
employment realm. Part IV offers startling statistics and background in-
formation regarding mental illness. This Part emphasizes society's (and
as made evident by Part III's survey, the federal courts' and govern-
ment's) underestimation of the impact of mental illness on both the indi-
vidual and society as a whole. In Part V this note proposes immediate
legislative action demanding parity between insurance coverage for
mental versus physical disabilities.
This crucial issue plagues millions of Americans each year. The
ADA has clearly not lived up to its promise to "eliminate" discrimination
and safeguard "equal opportunity" for the extraordinarily large portion of
disabled Americans who live with mental illness. Discrimination against
the mentally ill is as alive and well as ever, and, based on the legislative
history and the federal courts' interpretations of the ADA, it appears that
the ADA has actually sanctioned, and thereby encouraged, such discrimi-
nation. This note calls for new and immediate federal legislation that
actually does what the ADA only purported to do - even the playing
field between the disabled and nondisabled, and recognize mental illness
for the legitimate, typically treatable, and widespread ailment that it is.
[A]lthough the ADA promises profound advances in the civil rights
of people with disabilities, its practical application to the employment of
people with psychiatric disabilities is frequently cited as one of the most
poorly understood aspects of the law. A 1994 article in the Wall Street
Journal predicted that 'protecting the mentally ill against discrimination
may well prove to be the trickiest aspect of the controversial disabilities
law.' Unless employers can determine how to comply successfully with
5 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS
Div., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, Introduction
(1996).
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the ADA and feel motivated to do so, the law will have only a minimal
effect on the lives of people with psychiatric disabilities. 6
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA
A. BACKGROUND
The ADA protects an estimated 49 million disabled Americans. 7
These individuals are substantially limited in their abilities to engage in
activities like working, walking, talking, seeing, hearing, or caring for
themselves, to name a few.8 As of 1986, the unemployment rate of dis-
abled individuals averaged around 66 percent, while the unemployment
rate of their non-disabled peers was, at most, only ten to fifteen percent.9
The disabled population's "high unemployment rate ... is a drain on our
national resources and represents an absence in our labor pool of the
many individuals who want to contribute to our society," 10 not to men-
tion the personal drain on the millions of Americans suffering in a
stigma-friendly society.
Taking effect in July 1992,11 Title I of the ADA specifies that an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-man-
agement committee may not discriminate against any qualified individual
with a disability in regard to any term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment. 12 Prohibited discriminatory employment practices include those
pertaining to "recruitment, advertising, tenure, layoff, leave ... and all
other employment-related activities." 13 The anti-discrimination mandate
also applies to "rates of pay or any other form of compensation and
changes in compensation ... [and] fringe benefits available by virtue of
employment, whether or not administered by the [employer]." 4 The
ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in reg-
ulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in-
cluding the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it
would result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.' 5
6 MANCUSO, supra note 1, at vii.
7 NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 31.
8 Id.
9 BRUCE S. GROWICK & PATRICK L. DUNN, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION: CRITICAL ISSUES AND MAJOR EFFECTS 2 (1995).
10 Id.
1I MANCUSO, supra note 1, at 39.
12 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
101, at 17.
13 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM. AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS
Div., supra note 5, at 1.
14 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,$
102, at 27.
15 See id. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act covers "not only employment, but all
federally funded activities. It commands that 'otherwise qualified' individuals with disabilities
2001]
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B. DEFINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I of the
ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he or she is disabled, (2) that he or
she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his or her
job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that he or she
has suffered adverse employment action because of his or her disabil-
ity.16 The employer can defend itself against the plaintiff's claim with
evidence that the reasonable accommodations appropriate to the em-
ployee's disability would impose an "undue hardship" on the employer's
business. 17
1. Defining physical and mental impairment
A physical or mental impairment is a disability if its severity results
in a "substantial limitation" of one or more "major life activities." 18
The EEOC has defined "substantially limits" to mean:
(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, man-
ner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condi-
tion, manner or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major
life activity.19
Determination of substantial limitation must take into account: (1)
the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or anticipated
duration, and (3) its long-term impact.20
The EEOC and the Supreme Court have deemed "major life activi-
ties" to include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
cannot 'be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency' or the postal service." THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILIES ACT MANUAL: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, EMPLOYMENT
AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 102 (John Parry ed., 1992) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
16 See Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent
Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Ivy v. Jones, 192 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir.
1999) (internal citation omitted); Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 949-950
(8th Cir. 1999); Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1999), Doe
v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998).
17 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
18 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). The ADA additionally defines "disability" as "a
record of such an impairment [that substantially limits one or more major life activities]" or
"being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (2000).
20 See id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
THE FAILURE OF THE ADA
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing."'21 The Ninth Circuit, in deciding a case involving a man suffering
from anxiety and panic disorders, has recently added "sleeping, engaging
in sexual relations, and interacting with others" to the list,22 and the
Eighth Circuit has added "[slitting, standing, lifting and reaching. '23 In
other words, the list of activities set forth in EEOC regulations are not
exhaustive, but rather illustrative.2 4
A substantial limitation of the major life activity of working is evi-
dent when one is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
the average- person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. '25
Hence, one's inability to eform a.singleJobdoes not constitute a sub-
stantial limitation. 26
In ADA terms, "mental disability" encompasses both mental ill-
nesses and developmental disabilities.27 Since there is much overlap in
the types of illnesses in each of the categories, they are not entirely sepa-
rable.2 8 The ADA Manual defines "[m]ental illness [as] a group of ill-
nesses, including both mental and cognitive disorders, while
developmental disabilities are a variety of conditions grouped by their
severity and age of onset."' 29 Development disabilities include "physical,
cognitive, and mental illnesses that begin by early adulthood, are likely
to continue indefinitely, and produce a severe functional impairment, in
that they adversely affect one or more of the individual's major life activ-
ities."' 30 More specifically, "[i]ndividuals with psychiatric diagnoses
such as major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia may be
covered under the ADA, depending on how the condition affects their
functioning."'3' "Individuals with other psychiatric conditions (such as
21 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998) (quoting 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 4131(b)(2) (1997)).
22 McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1999).
23 Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999).
24 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998).
25 DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND, EXPLANATION OF THE CONTENTS
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 13 (1994); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines,
119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999) (ruling that with respect to the major life activity of working, the
plaintiff-employee must be "unable to work in a broad class of jobs").
26 DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND, supra note 25, at 13; see also
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
27 DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN & JOHN PARRY, Disability Definition and Terms, in THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL, supra note 15, at 97, 97.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 CORNELL UNIV., EMPLOYING AND ACCOMMODATING WORKERS WITH PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES 1 (1994).
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anxiety, personality, dissociative, or post-traumatic stress disorders) may
also be included" under the ADA's "mental disability" umbrella. 32
2. Establishing physical or mental impairment under the law
The United States Supreme Court has held that the availability of
mitigation or correction is crucial in determining whether a person has a
disability under the ADA. 33 In making this determination, a court should
not evaluate persons in their "hypothetical uncorrected state," but rather
with reference to the corrective measures available to them, such as
medications, auxiliary aids and reasonable accommodations. 34
This recent addition to the body of case law on the subject may have
serious implications for those suffering from mental illness. For in-
stance, the Eighth Circuit- recently cited these Supreme Court cases in
deciding an ADA case involving depression. 35 The court stated: "[A]
determination of whether [the plaintiff-employee's] depression is a disa-
bility must be made with reference to any mitigating measures he em-
ploys. 'A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently
'substantially limits' a major life activity.' "36 However, "the mere use
of a corrective device alone is not enough to relieve an individual of a
disability; rather, 'one has a disability ... if, notwithstanding the use of a
corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity.' 37
A "qualified individual" under the ADA, is a person who "with or
without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential -functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 38 This
analysis involves a two-pronged inquiry. First, the individual must have
the "requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related require-
ments of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."' 39 Second, the individual must be able to "perform the essential
functions of the position held or sought with or without reasonable
accommodation. '40
32 Id.
33 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
34 See id. at 480; see also Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1999); Ivy v. Jones, 192 F.3d 514, 516
(5th Cir. 1999).
35 Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1999).
36 Id. at 900 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-83) (internal citation omitted).
37 Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8h Cir. 1999) (citing Sutton,
527 U.S. at 488).
38 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1995).
39 Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(m) (2000)).
40 Id. at 145.
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Under the ADA, an employer "discriminates" if it does not make
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability .... ,,41 The em-
ployer is liable for discrimination under the ADA for its failure to ac-
commodate the employee's limitations if such limitations affect the
"terms, conditions or privileges" of the employee's employment. 42
Clearly then, the "reasonable accommodation" component of the ADA's
assurance of nondiscrimination is a critical one.
An employer makes a "[r]easonable accommodation... [by making]
any change in the work environment or in the way things are usually
done that results in equal employment opportunity for an individual with
a disability."'43 Courts have held that an employer has a duty to make
reasonable accommodations with respect to all employment decisions,
not simply those decisions regarding hiring and promotion. 44 Reasona-
ble accommodations "should be tailored to the needs of the individual
and the requirements of the job"45 and include "modifications or adjust-
ments that enable an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits
and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by other similarly situated
employees without disabilities." 46
In particular, reasonable accommodations may include "job restruc-
turing, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropri-
ate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other simi-
lar accommodations. ' 47 In sum, an employer that knows about an em-
ployee's disability but still fails to provide reasonable accommodations
violates the ADA. 48 This is true regardless of the employer's intent.49 In
other words, an employer, in failing to provide a reasonable accommoda-
tion, need not be "motivated by a discriminatory animus directed at the
disability" in order to violate the statute.50
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1995).
42 Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
43 SUSANNE M. BRUYERE & GWEN THAYER HANDELMAN, HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS AND
THE ADA, A TRAINER'S GUIDE 8 (1995).
44 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL
RIGHTS DIv., supra note 5.
45 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
101, at 22.
46 DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND, supra note 25, at 22 (emphasis
added).
47 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B).
48 See Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
49 See id.
50 Id.
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In making reasonable accommodations for an employee's physical
or mental disability, proof of undue hardship on the operation of the em-
ployer's business is a defense to a plaintiff's claim under the ADA. 51
The government has defined "[u]ndue hardship [as] an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, i.e., an action that is unduly costly, ex-
tensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature
of the program."152 A determination of undue hardship must account for
several factors, such as the nature and net cost of the accommodation, the
overall financial resources of the facility and the covered entity, the type
of operation of the covered entity, and the impact of the accommodation
upon the operation of the facility. 53
C. THE ADA's PROVISIONS REGARDING HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE
1. The ADA's provisions
Since the ADA's inception, covered entities have made great strides
in implementing the Act's employment provisions, thereby removing
formal barriers to the employment of the disabled. 54 However, many
barriers still exist. For instance, the ADA does not mandate that employ-
ers provide health insurance that will cover all of the medical conditions
of their employees.55
Instead, the ADA has a "safe-harbor" provision, disallowing one
from construing Titles I through III "to prohibit or restrict an insurer
from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law," unless the prohibi-
tion or restriction is "a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of Titles I or
111.56
Courts have interpreted the subterfuge clause quite liberally, often
ruling in favor of insurance companies. They have held that a litigant
must demonstrate the insurer had "an intent to evade" before finding the
insurer engaged in subterfuge to evade the purposes of Titles I and III of
the ADA. 57 Some courts have gone so far as to rule that underwriters
5t See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Higgins, 194 F.3d at 41.
52 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
101, at 24.
53 See Growick & Dunn, supra note 9, at 20.
54 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 7.
55 See Growick & Dunn, supra note 9, at 20 (emphasis added).
56 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1).
57 See, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1999).
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need not have based their decision with respect to disability coverage on
"sound actuarial principles." 58
An employer cannot "completely deny health insurance coverage to
an [employee] based on [his/her] diagnosis or disability. ' 59 While an
employer may offer insurance policies that "limit coverage for certain
procedures or treatments, e.g., only a specified amount per year for
mental health coverage," 60 an employer cannot deny coverage to a men-
tally ill person for other conditions "such as for a broken leg or for heart
surgery because of the existence of the mental health condition .... 61
Any limitations imposed on insurance coverage" must apply to persons
with or without disabilities. '62
In other words, employers may reduce opportunities or benefits to
all employees or categories of employees, 63 even though such limitations
will disproportionately affect disabled persons,64 as long as such reduc-
tions are not made for "discriminatory reasons. '65 For instance, an em-
ployer's leave policy if "uniformly applied ... does not violate the ADA
[by mere virtue of its having] a more severe effect on an individual be-
cause of his/her disability." 66 But "if an individual with a disability re-
quests a modification of such a policy as a reasonable accommodation,
an employer may be required to provide it, unless it would impose an
undue hardship. '67
The ADA also defines discrimination as "[p]articipating in a con-
tractual or other arrangement that has the effect of subjecting a qualified
applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited
58 Id. at 18; see also Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1999)
("It is one thing to say that an insurance company may not refuse to deal with disabled per-
sons; the prohibition of such refusals can probably be. administered with relatively little inter-
ference with state insurance regulation . . . . It is another thing to require federal courts to
determine whether limitations on coverage are actuarially sound. ... ); Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998) (opining that construing § 501(c) to mandate
underwriting based on sound actuarial principles would "require insurers to justify their cover-
age plans in [federal] court after a mere allegation by a plaintiff," thereby effecting a "seismic
shift in the insurance business").
59 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
102, at 28.
60 Interestingly, this text only targets mental health coverage as an example of a permis-
sible limitation.
61 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
102, at 28.
62 Id.
63 See Zuckerman & Parry, supra note 27, at 29.
64 WORKERS COMP. RESEARCH INST., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION 89 (Stacey Eccleston ed., 1992).
65 See THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT SERVICES, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 15, at 29.
66 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL
RIGHTS Div., supra note 5, at 9.
67 See id.
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by . . .Title [I]."68 Such an arrangement includes an employer's "rela-
tionship with ...an organization providing fringe benefits to an em-
ployee of the covered entity .... ,69 For purposes of the present
discussion, such a contractual arrangement would be that between the
private employer and its insurance carrier, through which the employer
offers its employees health insurance benefits.
2. Courts' interpretations of the ADA's mandate
Some of the above propositions were put to work70 in a recent court
of appeals decision. In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the Sev-
enth Circuit upheld an insurance cap for AIDS patients even though the
insurance company could not show that the cap was "consistent with
sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience,
bona fide risk classification, or state law."' 7 1 The court reasoned that,
although the cap concededly made the insurance policy less valuable to
people with AIDS, the insurer had not violated the ADA by imposing
such a cap because the insurance policy provided persons with AIDS the
same medical benefits as it did persons without AIDS, in terms of non-
AIDS related medical needs. 72
In a startling attempt at analogy, the court likened the AIDS pa-
tient's claim to that of a one-legged person complaining of a shoe store's
refusal to sell shoes other than by the pair.73 The court distinguished the
plaintiff's claim from a hypothetical case of an insurance plan's refusal
to provide the same coverage for a broken leg, or other afflictions not
peculiar to people with AIDS. 74 The court stated that such a hypothetical
case would be "a good example of discrimination by reason of disabil-
ity." 7 5 Finally, the court stated:
There is, as we have pointed out, a difference be-
tween refusing to sell a health-insurance policy at all to a
person with AIDS, or charging him a higher price for
such a policy, or attaching a condition obviously de-
signed to deter people with AIDS from buying the policy
(such as refusing to cover such a person with a broken
leg), on the one hand, and, on the other, offering insur-
68 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION, supra note 2,
102, at 28.
69 Id. at 28-29.
70 Though not in the private employment realm, but rather in a scenario involving an
insurance policy purchased directly from the insurer.
71 Doe, 179 F.3d at 558.
72 See id. at 559.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 561.
75 Id.
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ance policies that contain caps for various diseases some
of which may also be disabilities within the meaning of
the [ADA]. 76
However, in a case from the Northern District of Georgia with simi-
lar facts, the court invalidated an insurance company's cap on lifetime
benefits for AIDS treatment. 77 The court found that "insurance practices
are protected to the extent they are in accord with sound actuarial princi-
ples, reasonably anticipated experience, or bona fide risk classifica-
tion."' 78 Finding that the insurance company had not met its burden of
proof regarding the basis for its risk classification, the court went so far
as to postulate that "the underwriting risks associated with the treatment
of AIDS cannot be so different from the treatment of innumerable other
disabilities . . .,79
Perhaps more relevant to the issue currently at hand, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a
private insurance company discriminated against an individual on the ba-
sis of his mental disability "in violation of Title III of the [ADA] by
contracting with his employer ... to provide him with a health insurance
policy that limited coverage for mental disabilities to two years while
providing coverage for physical disabilities that was not so limited. '80
The court ultimately decided that a policy consistent with state law and
adopted prior to the ADA is "exempt from regulation under the [ADA]
pursuant to the safe harbor provision of Section 501(c), regardless
whether it was based on actuarial experience."'81 Since Congress had not
yet adopted the ADA, it was impossible for the policy to be the product
of an evasion of the ADA - a "subterfuge. '82
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia recently found that Title III is applicable to insurance underwriting
76 Id. at 563.
77 World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997). It should be noted that,
upon appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that part of the district court's decision regarding
AIDS and Title III on the grounds of mootness after the lower court rescinded the policy. See
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 156 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1998).
78 Branch, 988 F.Supp. at 1208.
79 Id. at 1209.
80 Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted).
Title III of the ADA, which generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility by so-called 'public accommodations,' provides in Section 302(a): No individ-
ual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
Id. at 101, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
81 Id. at 104-05.
82 Id. at 106.
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practices. 83 The court explained that "[i]f Title III were meant only to
prevent insurance companies from denying persons with disabilities
equal access to the physical plants of insurance offices, there would have
been no need for Congress to include the safe harbor provision dealing
with underwriting practices. 84
The court supported its ruling by pointing to the legislative history
of Title III. In particular, the court cited a House Report which stated
that an insurer could not charge an individual a different rate for insur-
ance coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment, "ex-
cept where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound
actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated expe-
rience" that certain conditions require some level of extraordinary ex-
pense.85 The court also pointed to another substantially similar House
Report in support of its conclusion. 86 The opinion continued to recog-
nize that the exercise of significant discretion on the part of underwriters
in setting insurance rates according to risk classifications presents the
potential for disability-based discrimination.8 7 Therefore, the basis of
such insurance rates must rest on sound actuarial principles. 88
Obviously, there is substantial disagreement among the circuit
courts of appeal regarding Title III's role in policing the insurance indus-
try. As made evident in Part III of this note, there is considerably less
disagreement among the federal courts regarding the application of Title
I to the regulation of insurance policies provided in the private employ-
ment realm.
A recently conducted telephone survey collaboratively administered
by the Society for Human Resource Management, Cornell University,
the Washington Business Group on Health, and the Lewin Group re-
vealed that "more than nine out of ten respondent[-employers] said that
no wage dispute (ninety-four percent), denied or reduced benefits
(ninety-three percent), or failure to rehire (ninety-two percent) claims
had been brought against their organizations under the ADA."'89
The same survey revealed that accommodations made for employ-
ees with disabilities included: (1) the making of existing facilities acces-
83 Chabner v. United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
84 Id. at 1190-91.
85 Id. at 1191 (quoting 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420).
86 Id. (quoting 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 493, which states that the safe harbor provision
"makes it clear that insurers may continue to sell to and underwrite individuals applying for
life, health, or other insurance on an individually underwritten basis, or to service such insur-
ance products, so long as the standards used are based on sound actuarial data and not specu-
lation") (alteration in original).
87 See id. at 1194.
88 See id.
89 Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT, THE ADA AT WORK: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EM-
PLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT 5 (1999).
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sible to employees with disabilities, (2) being flexible in its application
of human resources policies, (3) the restructuring of jobs or the modifica-
tion of work hours, (4) making parking or transportation accommoda-
tions, (5) the provision of written job instructions, (6) the modification of
the work environment, (7) the acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, (8) reassignments to vacant positions, (9) the changing of
supervisory methods, (10) the provision of qualified readers or interpret-
ers, and (11) the acquisition or modification of examination or training
materials. 90
The majority of respondents, however, admitted to not having made
any changes to health and other benefits as a direct response to the
ADA.9' More specifically, approximately eight out of ten organizations
interviewed made no changes to their long-term disability (seventy-eight
percent), health insurance (seventy-seven percent) or short-term disabil-
ity policies (seventy-seven percent) as a direct result of the ADA.92
II. COURTS OF APPEALS' TREATMENT OF HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR MENTAL VS.
PHYSICAL ILLNESS
A survey of the federal circuit courts reveals that, to date, eight
courts of appeal have directly addressed the issue of mental versus physi-
cal health insurance disparities as they relate to the ADA. 93 All eight
circuits have conclusively determined that the ADA does not mandate
parity between mental and physical disability benefits.
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit directly ad-
dressed the issue of "whether a disparity between disability benefits for
mental and physical disabilities violates the [ADA]". 94 The plaintiff, an
employee disabled by a mental disorder and unable to continue her em-
ployment, filed suit against her employer and its insurance carrier for
having implemented a two-year cap on mental disability benefits, but not
on physical disability benefits.95 More specifically, mental disability
benefits were capped at two years unless the disabled individual was hos-
pitalized, whereas physical disability benefits promised to continue as
needed until the disabled individual reached the age of sixty-five.96
90 Id. at 6.
91 See id. at 8.
92 Id.
93 These circuits include the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and the
District of Columbia.
94 145 F.3 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
95 Id. at 603-04.
96 Id. at 604.
20011
362 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:349
Finding that neither the ADA nor subsequent legislation contained
parity requirements for mental and physical disability benefits, 97 the
court held: "So long as every employee is offered the same plan regard-
less of that employee's contemporary or future disability status, then no
discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different coverage for
various disabilities. '98 The court further opined: "The ADA does not
require equal coverage for every type of disability; such a requirement, if
it existed, would destabilize the insurance industry in a manner definitely
not intended by Congress when passing the ADA."99
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of "whether Title II of the
[ADA] requires a state's long-term disability plan to provide equal bene-
fits for mental and physical disabilities" in Rogers v. Department of
Health and Environmental Control.100 In Rogers, a state employee was
covered by a long-term disability plan that provided one year of benefits
for mental disabilities and benefits to age 65 for physical disabilities.' 0 '
The plaintiff was diagnosed with a panic-anxiety disorder and received
disability benefits for one year. 10 2 "The plaintiff sued his employer after
the year's end, alleging that (1) he was discriminated against because he
was denied the same level of benefits as someone with a physical disabil-
ity, and (2) the plan's lower benefit level for mental disability was not
based on proper risk classification because the separate classification for
mental disability lacked a sound actuarial basis."'103
The Rogers court held that the ADA neither requires equal benefits
for mental and physical disabilities, 104 nor mandates that the plan spon-
sors justify risk classifications with actuarial data.10 5 The court based its
holding in part on House and Senate Committee interpretations of the
ADA: the relevant Committee Reports state that "[t]he Committee...
wishes to clarify that in its view ... employee benefit plans should not be
found to be in violation of this legislation under impact analysis simply
because they do not address the special needs of every person with a
disability, e.g., additional sick leave or medical coverage."' 1 6 The court
also looked to the EEOC's "interim policy guidance" on the application
of the ADA to health insurance, which states that employer-provided
97 Id. at 610.
98 Id. at 608.
99 Id.
100 174 F.3d 431, 432 (4th Cir. 1999). Though this note primarily addresses Title I of the
ADA, the court's reasoning with respect to the ADA, in general, is helpful in this analysis.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 436.
105 Id. at 437.
106 Id. at 434 (citing S. Rep. 101-116, at 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. 101-485, at 137 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420).
THE FAILURE OF THE ADA
health insurance plans that distinguish between the benefits provided for
the treatment of physical and mental conditions do not violate the
ADA. 107
More recently the Fourth Circuit decided the same issue, but with
respect to Title I and the private employment realm. 10 8 Like the Rogers
court, the court in Lewis ruled that Title I of the ADA does not require a
long-term disability plan sponsored by a private employer to provide the
same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities. 10 9 In this
case, the plaintiff-employee was covered under his employer's long-term
disability plan which capped mental disability benefits at two years but
only capped physical disability benefits upon a participant turning age
sixty-five."10 The plaintiff, who received disability benefits while on dis-
ability leave for severe depression, filed suit against his employer, alleg-
ing that he had been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his
mental disability because he was given less disability insurance coverage
than a person with a physical disability. 1" The Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's holding, 112 finding no material distinction between
Titles I and II of the ADA, and therefore relying on the same reasoning it
applied in Rogers.' 13
In Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Sixth Circuit
ruled on the issue of "whether Title III of the ADA prohibits an employer
from providing . . . a long-term disability plan issued by an insurance
company which contains longer benefits for employees who become dis-
abled due to a physical illness than for those who become disabled due to
a mental illness." 114 In this case, the plaintiff-employee, who suffered
from severe depression, challenged her employer's long-term disability
plan which capped mental disability benefits at twenty-four months un-
less hospitalization was involved, but provided physical disability bene-
fits to age sixty-five.1'5 "The court found that the ADA prohibits only
107 Id. at 435 (citing EEOC: INTERIM GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF ADA TO HEALTH
INSURANCE (June 8, 1993), reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7115, 7118).
108 Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
109 Id. at 168.
llO Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 172.
113 Id. at 170. "Title II of the ADA applies to 'public entities,' which include states and
their departments and agencies." Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131. "The
substance of Title II is that 'no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, [1] be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or [2] be subjected to discrimination by any such en-
tity."' Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added).
114 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997).
115 Id.
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discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled, and does not
mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities."" 16
In EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos., the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of "to what extent, if at all, the [ADA] requires equality of treat-
ment among disabilities in benefit plans." 17 A CNA employee, who
suffered from severe depression and bipolar illness, participated in her
employer's disability plan which capped mental disability benefits at two
years but provided physical disability benefits to age 65.118 "The EEOC
filed suit against CNA on behalf of the employee, alleging that CNA's
long-term disability plan discriminated against employees with mental or
nervous disorders, in violation of the ADA."' 19 Finding in favor of the
defendant-employer, the court noted:
[T]here is no claim here that CNA discriminated on the
basis of disability in offering its pension plan to anyone.
It did not charge higher prices to disabled people, on the
theory that they might require more in benefits .... Nor
did it vary the terms of its plan depending on whether or
not the employee was disabled. All employees - the
perfectly healthy, the physically disabled, and the men-
tally disabled - had a plan that promised them long-
term benefits from the onset of disability until age 65 if
their problem was physical, and long-term benefits for
two years if the problem was mental or nervous. This
may or may not be an enlightened way to do things, but
it was not discriminatory in the usual sense of the
term. 120
The court held that it would not support a claim for parity
"[w]ithout far stronger language in the ADA supporting" such. 121 The
court went on to state that mental health advocates have long been disap-
pointed in the narrow scope of the ADA, as "well-illustrated by the de-
bate over a proposed amendment to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996." 122 The proposed amendment, which was
ultimately defeated, would have mandated parity of coverage for mental
and physical conditions." 23 The court reasoned: "This debate reinforces
our conclusion based on the language of the ADA that the issue of parity
116 Id. at 1015.
117 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1044-45 (internal citations omitted).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1044.
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among physical and mental health benefits is one that is still in the legis-
lative arena."' 24 Ultimately, the court held that CNA's long-term disa-
bility plan's distinction between mental health benefits and other benefits
did not violate Title I of the ADA. 12 5
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,l2 6 the Eighth Circuit
addressed the general issue of discrimination under the ADA as it per-
tained to a private employer's medical benefits plan that excluded cover-
age for treatment of infertility problems. In upholding the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the employer, the court likened the plan's
limitation to that contained in many employer benefit plans which draw
distinctions between physical and mental health care coverage.' 27 The
court stated:
Insurance distinctions that apply equally to all in-
sured employees, that is, to individuals with disabilities
and to those who are not disabled, do not discriminate on
the basis of disability .... Such broad distinctions which
apply to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar condi-
tions and which constrain individuals both with and
without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disabil-
ity. Consequently, although such distinctions may have
a greater impact on certain individuals with disabilities,
they do not intentionally discriminate on the basis of dis-
ability and do not violate the ADA.' 28
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue of "whether an em-
ployer and its insurance administrator can offer a group disability insur-
ance policy ... that gives more benefits for physical disabilities than for
mental disabilities, without violating the [ADA] .... -129 The plaintiff-
employee was covered under her employer's long-term disability insur-
ance policy, which capped mental disability benefits at twenty-four
months yet provided physical disability benefits to age sixty-five. 130 The
plaintiff, who suffered from severe depression, filed suit under Titles I
and II of the ADA against her employer and its insurance carrier when
her mental disability benefits ceased after the twenty-four-month
period.131
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1045.
126 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
127 See id. at 678.
128 Id. (citing EEOC: INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF ADA TO
HEALTH INSURANCE (June 8, 1993), reprinted in Fair. Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7115,
7118).
129 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).
130 Id. at 1107-08.
131 Id. at 1108.
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The court stated that "there is no discrimination under the [ADA]
where disabled individuals are given the same opportunity as everyone
else, so insurance distinctions that apply equally to all employees cannot
be discriminatory."'' 32 The court supported its decision by noting that
"[i]nsurers have historically and consistently made distinctions between
mental and physical illness in offering health and disability coverage." 133
The court further explained:
Since the passage of the [ADA], Congress passed
the Mental Health Parity Act, which requires that health
plans with no limit for medical benefits must also have
no limit on mental health benefits. Congress rejected an
amendment to the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 that would have required parity
in insurance coverage for mental and physical illnesses.
Had Congress provided that the Act means what
Weyer . . . urge[s], then this subsequent legislation
would have been superfluous. 134
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of "whether the ADA prohib-
its an employer from operating a long-term disability benefits plan which
distinguishes between physical and mental disabilities" in Kimber v. Thi-
okol Corp. 135 The plaintiff in this case brought suit against his employer
upon the discontinuance of his disability benefits after two years. 136 The
employer's benefit plan capped coverage for mental conditions at
twenty-four months, yet afforded coverage for physical disabilities until
age sixty-five. 37 The court admittedly "adopted" the reasoning of sev-
eral other circuits, finding in favor of the defendant-employer. 38 The
court reasoned, in part: "While [Thiokol's disability] plan differentiated
between types of disabilities, this is a far cry from a specified employee
facing differential treatment due to her disability. Every [Thiokol] em-
ployee had the opportunity to join the same plan with the same schedule
of coverage, meaning that every [Thiokol] employee received equal
treatment."139
The irony of this case is that the plaintiff initially took leave of
absence due to complications resulting from his diabetic condition,
which would have afforded him coverage until age sixty-five, assuming
132 Id. at 1116.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1117.
135 196 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999).
136 Id. at 1097.
137 Id. at 1095.
138 Id. at 1101.
139 Id.
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that his disability continued.1 40 His benefits were capped, however, only
at the point when his physician advised his employer that he could not
return to work due to the depression, mild dementia and anxiety disorder
which he was experiencing "secondary to his diabetes."' 14 1 The em-
ployer, in turn, "found that Mr. Kimber was totally disabled 'due, at least
in significant part to a mental condition.'"1 42
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed a related issue in Mod-
demo v. King. 143 In that case, the defendant-employer's benefit plan
limited mental health care benefits to a $75,000 lifetime maximum, with
no such corresponding limitation placed on physical health care bene-
fits. 144 The plaintiff-employee, who suffered from a mental illness, filed
suit against her employer, alleging that the disparity in coverage between
mental and physical health care violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(the mother Act of the ADA).' 45
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise qual-
ified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from ... participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any ...
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency .... 146 The
court was charged with deciding "whether the Plan's differential treat-
ment of mental and physical illness excludes [the plaintiff] from partici-
pation in, denies her the benefits of, or subjects her to discrimination
within the meaning of the statute."' 147 The court ultimately determined
that "distinctions between mental and physical care are no more vulnera-
ble under § 504 than are completely generalized limits."' 148
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that the 1992 amendment to the
Rehabilitation Act, which incorporated the standards of several sections
of the ADA into § 504, saved her case. 149 The amendment reads: "The
standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be
the standards applied under Title I of the [ADA] ... and the provisions
of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the [ADA] ... as such sections
relate to employment."'150 In response to the allegation, and as an ulti-
140 See id. at 1096.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
144 Id. at 1060.
145 Id.
146 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2001).
147 Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1060.
148 Id. at 1062.
149 Id. at 1063.
150 Id. (citing Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 506, 106
Stat. 4344 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)).
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mate rejection of the plaintiff's claim, the court referred the plaintiff to
§ 501(c) of the ADA, which creates a safe-harbor for insurance plans. 151
III. MENTAL ILLNESS IN THIS COUNTRY
Some diseases are more politically 'in' than others. We all know
the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds,
and the more patient-protection legislation. My guess is that if AIDS
rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate cancer is a 6 ... Yes, you
guessed it. I am unable to assign a number to the mental health category.
If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, this category is
close to the bottom of the food-chain. 52
Mental illnesses are brain disorders disruptive of a person's think-
ing, feeling, moods, and ability to relate to others. 153 In much the same
way as diabetes is a disorder of the pancreas, mental illnesses are disor-
ders of the brain, often resulting in a "diminished capacity for coping
with the ordinary demands of life."' 154 Contrary to lingering public per-
ception, mental illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of
character, or poor upbringing.155
As of 1994, the federal government estimated that 3.3 million
American adults - approximately two percent of the population - had
a serious mental illness. 156 Mental illness, including suicide, accounts
for over fifteen percent of the burden of disease in established market
economies such as the United States. 157 That figure constitutes more
than the disease burden caused by all cancers combined. 158 "[Miajor
depression rank[s] second only to ischemic heart disease in magnitude of
disease burden in established market economies."' 59 In fact, mental dis-
151 Id.
152 B.G. Erengil, Managed Care: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You!, Wellness Web,
at http://www.wellweb.com/GRASS/bgopin.html (last visited Nov. 10, 1999) (emphasis
added).
153 Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, What Is Mental Illness?, at http://www.nami.org/
disorder/whatis.html (last visited Nov. 10, 1999).
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 CORNELL UNIV., supra note 31, at 1.
157 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, ". . the Burden of Psychiatric Conditions Has Been
Heavily Underestimated..." The Impact of Mental Illness on Society - Science on Our Minds
2001, at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/burden.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 1999).
158 Id.
159 Id. As of 1990 unipolar major depression accounted for 6.8% of the disease burden in
established market economies, whereas ischemic heart disease accounted for 9%. Unipolar
major depression ranked above cardiovascular disease, road traffic accidents and lung cancers,
to name a few. However, "projections show that with the aging of the world population and
the conquest of infectious diseases, psychiatric and neurological conditions could increase
their share of the total global disease burden by almost half, from 10.5 percent of the total
burden to almost 15 percent in 2020. Id.
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orders account for four of the ten leading causes of disability for persons
ages five and older. 160 Major depression is the leading cause of disabil-
ity in "developed" nations, such as the United States. 61 Also near the
top of these rankings are manic-depressive illness, schizophrenia, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder. 162
A. SELECT TYPES OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Depression directly and indirectly costs the United States over thirty
billion dollars per year.' 63 Each year, almost nineteen million American
adults suffer from a depressive illness. 164 Nearly two of the thirty-four
million Americans ages sixty-five and older suffer from depression. 165
The number of women suffering from major depressive disorders each
year is nearly double that of men.' 66 Besides the obvious emotional toll
depression has on its sufferers and their families, depression also in-
creases the risk of having a heart attack considerably. 167 More specifi-
cally, according to a recent study that covered a thirteen-year period,
individuals with a history of major depression were four times as likely
to suffer a heart attack compared to people without such a history. 168
The National Institute of Mental Health has estimated that the magnitude
of disability suffered by individuals with major depression equals that
associated with blindness or paraplegia. 69
More than 2.3 million adult Americans suffer from bi-polar disor-
der.' 70 As many as twenty percent of people with manic-depressive ill-
ness commit suicide.' 7' Suicide is not only the concern of manic-
depressives however, as in 1996, approximately 31,000 people died from
suicide in the United States. 172 Ten percent of the estimated two million
adult Americans suffering from schizophrenia, for instance, eventually
commit suicide. 73 More generally, nearly all suicide victims have a
160 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Improving the Nation's Health, at http://
www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/improve.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 1999).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, The Numbers Count, at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publi-
cat/numbers.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 1999).
164 Id.
165 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Educating Older Americans and Health Professionals
about the Risks of Depression, at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/events/prolderadults.cfm (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 1999).
166 See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, supra note 163.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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diagnosable mental disorder, most commonly depression or a substance
abuse disorder. 174 Suicide was the third leading cause of death among 15
to 24 year olds in 1996.175
Over 19 million Americans suffer from anxiety disorders, including
panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress dis-
order, phobias and generalized anxiety disorder. 176 Many of them have
co-occurring disorders such as depression, alcohol or drug abuse, or
other mental disorders. 177 Collectively, anxiety disorders were estimated
to have cost the nation $46.6 billion in 1990.178
B. DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
The majority of people suffering from mental disorders can be accu-
rately diagnosed and effectively treated. 179 In fact, treatments for mental
disorders are actually "better studied and more effective than those for
many other common, chronic human illnesses."' 180 The majority of peo-
ple "who have received treatment for mental illnesses show genuine im-
provement over time and lead stable, productive lives."181
Despite the availability of effective treatments, treatment services
have not been liberally provided.182 Americans rely primarily on health
insurance to pay their medical bills, yet many insurance plans either se-
verely limit or entirely deny coverage for mental disorders. 183 A miscon-
ception exists "that providing parity - coverage for mental illnesses on
the same level as other disorders - will 'break the bank' and leave little
money to provide services to treat major medical disorders."' 184 Notably,
"[t]his myth developed during an era when most insurance companies
offered 'fee-for-service' plans ... however, there has been an explosive
growth in managed care, which has had a powerful braking effect on all
aspects of health care."' 185 The National Institute of Mental Health re-
cently examined the provision of mental health services in the context of
managed care, and concluded that the combination of parity and man-
174 id.
175 Id.
176 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Anxiety Disorders Education Program, at http://
www.nimh.nih.gov/anxiety (last visited Nov. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Anxiety Disorders].
177 Id.
178 Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Quick Facts About Anxiety Disorders, at http://
www.nimh.nih.gov/anxiety/anxiety/idx-fax.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001).
179 See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, The Equivalence of Mental Illnesses with General
Illnesses, at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/equal.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2001) [herein-
after Equivalence of Mental Illnesses].
180 Id.
181 CORNELL UNIV., supra note 31, at 2.
182 See Equivalence of Mental Illnesses, supra note 179.
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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aged care would likely result in overall lowered mental health treatment
costs and lower premiums. 186
Due to a widespread lack of understanding and the stigma associ-
ated with mental disorders, many people suffering from them remain un-
diagnosed and untreated.187 In a day and age when treatments for mental
disorders have proven effective, 188 when the body of scientific knowl-
edge regarding mental health has grown exponentially, and when high
profile individuals such as Tipper Gore have revealed their own personal
struggles with mental illness, one must ask, emphatically: Why? One
thing is certain. The stigma associated with mental illness has supported
the disparity in health care coverage. Parity may help lessen societal fear
of mental illness, thereby encouraging mentally ill individuals to seek
treatment.
Some participants in the 1995 Center for Mental Health Services
ADA Roundtable expressed the view that the entertainment and news
media offered stigmatizing images of people with psychiatric disabili-
ties. 189 Such images significantly contribute to the presence and preva-
lence of prejudice against the mentally ill.' 90 Participants noted the
media's tendency to highlight the mental health problems of people who
commit violent acts.191 Indeed, a 1993 study by George Gerbner of the
University of Pennsylvania concluded that the mentally ill were the most
negatively portrayed of all stigmatized minority groups in prime-time tel-
evision.1 92 In particular, mentally ill characters are more likely to por-
tray villains than heroes, and they are often made to seem generally
incompetent. 193 "Whatever the root of the prejudice, the continuous ex-
posure to such images reinforces and promotes negative attitudes toward
people with mental illness."' 194
United States Surgeon General Dr. David Satcher recently issued a
groundbreaking report on mental health - notably the first of its kind
ever issued. 195 In it, the Surgeon General recognized the "inextricably
intertwined relationship between our mental health and our physical
health and well-being" and opened: "[M]ental health is often an after-
186 Id.
187 Anxiety Disorders, supra note 176.
188 Id.
189 MANCUSO, supra note 1, at 11.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 11-12.
192 Id. at 12.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Nelba Chavez et al., Foreward to OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., U.S. PUB.
HEALTH SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library.
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thought and illnesses of the mind remain shrouded in fear and
misunderstanding."196
He estimated that mental disorders affect nearly one in five Ameri-
cans each year, "yet continue too frequently to be spoken of in whispers
and shame."' 197 Dr. Satcher praised contemporary mental health research
for the extent to which it has "mended the destructive split between
'mental' and 'physical' health," and yet noted that "the mental health
field is plagued by disparities in the availability of and access to its ser-
vices."198 The Surgeon General issued the report as a call to action, in
part, to address the problem of health insurance with inadequate mental
health benefits. 199 "We have allowed stigma and a now unwarranted
sense of hopelessness about the opportunities for recovery from mental
illness to erect ... barriers. It is time to take them down." 200
According to the Surgeon General's Report, about 15 percent of all
adults and 21 percent of U.S. children and adolescents utilize mental
health care services each year.20 1 "[D]uring a one-year period, about one
in five American adults - or 44 million people - have diagnosable
mental disorders." 202 Roughly 28 percent of the population has either a
mental or addictive disorder,20 3 yet a mere eight percent of the popula-
tion both has a diagnosable disorder and uses mental health services,
leaving over two-thirds of adults with diagnosable mental disorders who
do not receive treatment. 20 4 Similarly, the majority of children with
mental disorders are not receiving mental health care. 205
C. COST OF TREATMENT
The ADA is, at its core, a civil rights law, grounded in the freedoms
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. As such, the rights and freedoms codi-
fied in the ADA should not be subject to a debate on their cost, any more
than the rights of women, minorities, or religious groups. 20 6
The "1998 Robert Wood Johnson national household telephone sur-
vey revealed that 11 percent of the general population considered them-
selves in need of mental or addictive services, while about 25 percent of
these individuals reported difficulties in obtaining such treatment. 20 7
196 Id.
197 OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at Preface.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 405.
202 Id. at 408.
203 See id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 409.
206 NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 11.
207 OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 409.
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Concern about "costs was listed as the highest reason for not receiving
care, by 83 percent of the uninsured and 55 percent of the privately in-
sured listing this reason." 20 8
According to the Surgeon General's Report, "[s]ixteen percent of
the U.S. adult population - largely the working poor - have no health
insurance at all,' 20 9 and "[m]any others are inadequately insured. 21 0
The report states further that "[a]lthough some state/local/and other Fed-
eral government support goes to those who are underinsured in the pri-
vate and public insured groups, these funds are primarily allocated to the
uninsured population. '211 Approximately "sixty-one percent of the pop-
ulation has employment-based private insurance.1 212 This figure makes
clear the "importan[ce] ... [of] ensur[ing] that the private sector can
meet the full treatment needs of [its] charges. 2 13
Mental disorders are an undoubtedly emotional and financial burden
on ill individuals and their families. Our Nation also bears a portion of
the brunt "in reduced or lost productivity (indirect costs) and in medical
resources used for care, treatment, and rehabilitation (direct costs).12 1 4
1. Indirect costs of mental illness
The Surgeon General's Report indicates that "[i]ndirect costs of all
mental illness imposed nearly a $79 billion loss on the U.S. economy in
1990. Most of that amount ($63 billion) reflected morbidity costs - the
loss of productivity in usual activities because of illness.121 5 However,
"indirect costs also include nearly $12 billion in mortality costs, 216 and
nearly $4 billion in other types of productivity losses.217 These indirect
cost estimates do not even begin to reflect the pain and suffering also
associated with mental illness. 21 8
2. Direct costs
As for the direct costs of mental illness, mental health insurance
coverage "is typically less generous than .. .[that for] general health
208 Id.
209 Id. at 407.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 415, Table 6-3.
212 Id. at 415, Table 6-3.
213 Id. at 408.
214 Id. at 411.
215 Id. Such loss includes "lost or reduced productivity at the workplace, school and
home."
216 Id. Mortality costs reflect "lost productivity due to premature death."
217 Id. Productivity losses reflect (1) the loss to society of the productivity of mentally ill,
incarcerated individuals and (2) the time spent by individuals providing family care for the
mentally ill.
218 Id.
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insurance coverage.1 2 19 In response to this discrepancy, the "govern-
ment plays a larger role in financing mental health services compared to
overall health care."'220 Notably, "recent efforts to destigmatize demen-
tias and improve care have removed some insurance coverage limita-
tions. '22 1 For instance, "[o]nce mostly the province of the public sector,
Alzheimer's disease now enjoys more comprehensive coverage, and care
is better integrated into the private health care system. Inequities in cov-
erage are diminishing. '222 Alzheimer's disease represents the success
story - an illness once discarded to the "senility" or "crazy" backburner
is now the subject of social understanding and compassion.
National expenditures for treatment of mental illness amounted to
$66.7 billion in 1996.223 That figure represents a 7.2 percent increase in
the average annual expenditures for the treatment of mental health, alco-
hol and other drug abuse ("MHAOD") between 1986 and 1996.224 To
put that figure in proper perspective, note that there was an 8.3 percent
average annual growth rate for national health care expenditures. 22 5
Hence, the "MHAOD spending growth rate was slower than the growth
rate for national health care expenditures. '22 6 Moreover, "It]he private
insurance share of MHAOD expenditures remained relatively constant
between 1986 and 1996."227 Further, MHAOD expenditures represented
only 8.1 percent of the $942.7 billion in national health care expenditures
in 1996.228 This represents a decrease from 1986, when MHAOD treat-
ment expenditures were nine percent of total national health
expenditures. 229
In 1996, approximately 53 percent ($37 billion) of the funding for
mental health treatment came from taxpayers.2 30 "Of the 47 percent ($32
billion) of expenditures from private sources, more than half ($18 bil-
lion) were from private insurance."'231 Out-of-pocket payments com-
219 Id. at 412.
220 Id. In 1996, the United States spent $69 billion on mental health services. Id. at 413.
221 Id. at 413.
222 Id.
223 Substance Abuse Spending Continues Downward Trend, JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE,
Sept. 30, 1998 at http://www.jointogether.org/sa/resources/funding/news/reader.jtml?Object-
ID=255584 (last visited on Apr. 9, 2001).
224 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., NATIONAL EXPENDITURES
FOR MENTAL HEALTH, ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT (1996), at http://
www.health.org/mhaod/spending.html.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE, supra note 223.
229 Id.
230 OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 413.
231 Id.
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prised most of the remainder.2 32 In other words, the mentally ill
themselves funded their own treatment to nearly the same extent as did
their private insurers. More specifically, "for a family with mental health
treatment expenses of $35,000 a year, the average out-of-pocket burden
is $12,000; for those with $60,000 in mental health expenses a year, the
burden averages $27,000. ' 233 In contrast, the out-of-pocket expense of a
family paying for medical or surgical treatment is only $1,500 and
$1,800, respectively. 234
"[O]utpatient prescription drugs, which account for about 9 percent
of total mental health direct costs, represented one of the fastest-rising
expenses for mental health services. ' 235 "The higher than average
growth rate (almost ten percent) of spending for prescription drugs re-
flects, in part, the increasing availability and application of medications
of demonstrable efficacy in treating mental disorders. '236 Recent case
law regarding the availability of corrective measures may spike this fig-
ure even more in the future, since a mentally ill individual whose ailment
is treatable by means of medication is no longer considered "disabled"
under the ADA. 237
3. Private health insurance
Not surprisingly, health insurance is one of the most important fac-
tors determining whether one has both general and mental health care
services. 23 8 Eighty-four percent of Americans have some sort of insur-
ance coverage - principally workplace-obtained private insurance. 239
However, the adequacy of such insurance for mental health care varies
considerably, depending on plans and sponsors. 240 In 1996, private plans
provided "more than $32 billion ... for mental health services ... almost
$12 billion [of which] came from client out-of-pocket payments, and
more than $2 billion [of which] came from other private sources. 24 1
There has been an increasing trend of insurance carriers limiting
coverage for mental health care services in the private employment
232 Id.
233 Id. at 427.
234 See id.
235 Id. at 416.
236 Id.
237 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999) (persons are not to
be evaluated in their "hypothetical uncorrected state," but rather are to be evaluated with refer-
ence to the corrective measures available to them); see also Murphy v. UPS, 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Ivy v.
Jones, 192 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1999)
238 OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 413.
239 See id. at 419.
240 Id.
241 Id. (emphasis addeci)
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realm. 242 As noted above, however, private insurance coverage for pre-
scription drugs has expanded dramatically over the past fifteen years. 243
Mental and physical health insurance coverage has actually achieved par-
ity in the area of pharmaceuticals. 244 Such a dramatic "shift in mental
health spending in private insurance toward pharmaceutical agents," 245
should give anyone paying attention pause, however. Arguably, many
may view pharmaceutical agents as quick fixes to the problems associ-
ated with mental health insurance coverage. The parity "achieved" with
regard to pharmaceutical coverage, in light of the increasing disparity
between general mental and physical health care coverage, is therefore
suspicious at best.
Why is private health insurance generally more restrictive in cover-
age of mental illness than in coverage for somatic illness? Because it can
afford to be; namely, the public sector exists as a guarantor of "cata-
strophic care" for the uninsured and underinsured, thereby permitting or
even encouraging the private sector to "avoid financial risk and focus on
acute care of less impaired individuals, most of whom [receive] health
insurance benefits through their employer. 246
Individuals with mental illness are left paying out-of-pocket for a
higher proportion of mental health services than they would for general
health services, "fac[ing] catastrophic financial losses (and/or transfer to
the public sector) when the costs of their care [exceed] their limits. 24 7
Ironically, the very purpose of health insurance is to help shield individu-
als from catastrophic financial loss. 248 Insurance companies' lower an-
nual or lifetime limits on mental health care leave patients and their
families exposed to profound financial risks.249 "The legacy of the pub-
lic mental health system safety net as the provider of catastrophic cover-
age encouraged such practices. '250 Coverage limitations reduce
appropriate use of mental health care services and leave individuals to
bear catastrophic costs themselves. 25'
Fee-for-service insurance, the predominant method of financing
health care as late as 1988, has given way to various management tech-
niques such that insurance that used "unmanaged fee-for-service" as its
payment mechanism has decreased from 71 percent to 15 percent in the
242 See id. at 417.
243 See id.
244 Id. at 419.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 418.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 420.
250 Id.
251 Id.
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past decade. 252 As per the 1999 Surgeon General's report, "[m]anaged
care arrangements (HMO, PPO, or POS plans), which fundamentally al-
ter the way in which health care resources are allocated, now cover the
majority (56 percent) of Americans. '253 Therefore, access to mental
health services is now increasingly under the supervision of managed
behavioral care companies and employers.2 54 "[M]ental health services
associated with private insurance, public insurance, and public direct-
service programs often have managed mental health care arrangements
that are organized differently than are overall health services." 255
If the fear of unnecessary utilization was a primary reason behind
limited mental health care benefits in the past, one might expect such
benefit limits to fall by the wayside in light of the increasingly managed
health care system of today. The "hazard of unnecessary utilization need
not be addressed through benefit design" in a managed care system. 256
Managed care reduces cost in several ways, including by (1) "shifting
treatment from inpatient to outpatient settings," (2) "negotiat[ing] dis-
counted hospital and professional fees," and (3) "using utilization man-
agement techniques to limit unnecessary services. '25 7 Hence, at least
theoretically, unnecessary utilization is "eliminated at the source, on a
case-by-case basis. 258
Approximately 177 million Americans are now covered under man-
aged behavioral health care organizations. 259 In the event of the expan-
sion of mental health care benefits, it would be possible for managed
mental health care plans "to tighten the level of supply-side controls to
maintain costs at a desired level."260 Managed care, then, no doubt
reduces the cost of mental health services. 261 There remains the risk,
however, that such a focus on cost-containment may lead to undertreat-
ment because the supply-side controls utilized by managed care pro-
grams may be exercised too liberally. 262 However, despite warranted
concern about managed care's relation to potential undertreatment, the
actual impact of managed care's cost reductions has been under-
studied.263 Rather, some long-term case studies have noted that the
252 Id. at 422.
253 Id. (citation omitted)
254 See id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 423.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See id. (citation omitted)
260 Id.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See id. at 424.
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probability of using mental health care will actually increase after man-
aged behavioral health care is implemented in private insurance plans. 264
IV. PROPOSAL
A. SUPREME COURT
As one option, this note considers proposing that the Supreme Court
rule liberally on the matter of insurance coverage. There are two major
problems with such a proposal however. First, the federal circuits that
have ruled on the issue of parity with respect to mental and physical
health care coverage in the private employment realm are in agreement
that the ADA does not require such a notion. The Supreme Court is,
therefore, unlikely to grant certiorari, given that there is apparently noth-
ing for it to "resolve" in terms of confusion or disagreement with respect
to the federal legislation.
Even if the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari, any
plaintiff-favorable action on the part of the Supreme Court with respect
to this issue would constitute an absolute contradiction of federal case
law precedent. While such a scenario is by no means prohibited, it is
unusual nonetheless. Second, a favorable Supreme Court ruling would
appear to contradict other highly authoritative interpretations of the
ADA, two of which the Fourth Circuit relied upon in rendering its
decision.265
Despite these problems, the Supreme Court should revisit these is-
sues. First, it is not beyond reason to suggest that the various circuits
have relied too heavily on each other's analyses and, perhaps, not af-
forded the issue the proper and thorough consideration that it surely de-
serves. For instance, in Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., the court stated: "This
issue has been argued extensively in the other circuits and we see no
need to address it at length here. '266 The court went on to offer one page
of reasoning to support its holding, in which it merely quoted from vari-
ous other circuits' prior opinions on the issue. No doubt that this is, to an
extent, common practice among courts of appeals, but both the issue at
hand and the ADA itself are too cumbersome to dismiss with one page of
virtual plagiarism.
A second and related reason to challenge the Supreme Court's si-
lence even in the face of the federal courts' unanimity is the enormous
effect the ADA has on the disabled. Mental illness adversely affects too
great a percentage of the population not to be addressed by the highest
264 See id.
265 See Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 432 (4th Cir. 1999)
(relying on S. Rep. 101-116, at 85 (1989); H.R. Rep. 101-485, at 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420; also relying on the EEOC's "interim policy guidance").
266 196 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999).
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court in this country. Since only 1990, eight of the twelve Circuits have
directly addressed the issue. Why? Because it was brought before them
by people who had been, no doubt, discriminated against based on their
mental illness. The plaintiffs in the cases cited in Part III undoubtedly
believed that the spirit of the ADA disallowed such blatantly unfair prac-
tices which do indeed discriminate against the millions of people directly
affected by mental illness. It is simply insufficient for the federal courts
to have dismissed such claims on the basis of the fact that the challenged
insurance plans did not adversely affect the mentally ill's access to physi-
cal health care benefits.
The Supreme Court has never held that it is unlawful under the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to give preferential treatment to one disa-
bility over another. In fact, in Traynor v. Turnage,267 the Supreme Court
upheld, under section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act,2 68 the extension
of educational benefits to one class of disabled persons and not to others.
According to the Court, the preferential treatment of one disability over
another was permissible under section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act
because "there is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any
benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be ex-
tended to all other categories of handicapped persons. ' 269 In reaching
this holding, the Court emphasized that "the central purpose of § 504...
is to assure that handicapped individuals receive 'evenhanded treatment'
in relation to nonhandicapped individuals. T270
Along the same lines, but perhaps even more indicative of the Su-
preme Court's opinion on the matter currently at issue, is a 1985 case
that decided that the effect upon the handicapped of a state's reduction in
annual inpatient coverage was not cognizable under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.271 In that case, the Court stated that an employer
need only provide an employee "meaningful access" to his or her em-
ployer's benefit.272 While the Court conceded that "to assure meaningful
access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit
may have to be made,"2 73 it ultimately found that the facially neutral
reduction in inpatient coverage was not discriminatory in that the reduc-
tion "will leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users
with identical ... hospital services .. . .,274 This reasoning, which mis-
takenly pits the disabled against the nondisabled, is mirrored in the recent
267 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
268 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2001).
269 Traynor, 485 U.S. at 549.
270 Id. at 548.
271 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
272 Id. at 301.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 302.
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opinions of the courts of appeals cited above in Part III. The Supreme
Court went on to state that, while the Rehabilitation Act "seeks to assure
evenhanded treatment . .. [it] does not ...guarantee ...equal re-
suits. '275 In a disappointing display of statutory interpretation, the Court
stated that "[slection 504 does not require the State to alter [its] defini-
tion of the benefit being offered simply to meet the reality that the handi-
capped have greater medical needs. 276
Further indication that new legislation, as opposed to another judi-
cial opinion, is necessary is the Seventh Circuit's ruling in EEOC v. CNA
Ins. Cos.277 In EEOC, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would not sus-
tain a claim for parity "[w]ithout far stronger language in the ADA sup-
porting" such. 278 The court noted:
Few, if any, mental health advocates have thought
that the result they would like to see has been there all
along in the ADA. This is well-illustrated by the debate
over a proposed amendment to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (1996). The amendment, which
was defeated before final passage of the bill, would have
required parity of coverage for mental and physical con-
ditions ... This debate reinforces our conclusion based
on the language of the ADA that the issue of parity
among physical and mental health benefits is one that is
still in the legislative arena. 279
Ultimately, the court held that CNA's long-term disability plan's
distinction between mental health benefits and other benefits did not vio-
late Title I of the ADA.2 80
B. NEW LEGISLATION
While the ADA Manual claims that an employer may not "limit,
segregate, or classify" an employee such that the employee's employ-
ment opportunities are restricted, 281 that is exactly the state of affairs
with respect to mental health insurance in this country. Although the
ADA has been read to mandate that employers have a duty to accommo-
date their employees' disabilities "in order to remove barriers that could
impede the ability of qualified individuals with disabilities to perform
275 Id. at 304.
276 Id. at 303.
277 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
278 Id. at 1044.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 1045.
281 See Zuckerman & Parry, supra note 27, at 29.
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their jobs,"282 legislative commentary and federal courts' decisions fol-
lowing the enactment of the ADA have done little to remove such barri-
ers for the mentally ill. Statistics on the mental illness crisis in this
country make clear that inequitable health insurance barriers in the pri-
vate employment realm have, in fact, impeded the ability of qualified
mentally ill individuals from performing their jobs. While the ADA-
mandated removal of architectural and transportation barriers was a step
in the right direction, these types of barriers are not the only ones faced
by the disabled. 283 Legislation which duly recognizes the full plight of
the disabled - including that of the overwhelming number of mentally
ill Americans - is in order.
In Modderno,284 the D.C. Circuit determined that section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act does not mandate parity in health care coverage of
mental and physical disabilities. In doing so, however, the court also
conceded: "Perhaps mentally disabled individuals are more vulnerable to
discrimination than the physically disabled. If so, then Congress might
wish to enact a statute affording the mentally disabled special protection.
But the Rehabilitation Act is simply not such a statute. '285
This call for parity legislation is primarily motivated by the desire to
cover mental illness fairly with respect to somatic illness. Effective par-
ity legislation would require all insurers to offer mental health coverage
equivalent to the coverage offered for all other disorders. Managed
care's probable ability to control costs, as explained in Part IV, without
limiting benefits makes a parity mandate a more reasonably achievable
possibility than it might have been under a fee-for-service system.286
1. Previous efforts at parity legislation
Prior federal legislative efforts to achieve mental health insurance
parity date back to the 1970s. 287 Passed in 1996 and implemented in
1998, the Mental Health Parity Act ("MHPA") 288 focused on the inequi-
ties in mental health insurance coverage only as they exist with respect to
"catastrophic" benefits.2 89 The MHPA "prohibited the use of lifetime
and annual limits on coverage that were different for mental and somatic
illnesses." 290
282 McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1237.
283 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CivIL RIGHTS
Div., supra note 5, at 29.
284 82 F.3d 1059.
285 Id. at 1062.
286 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 426.
287 Id. at 427.
288 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, Title Vii, § 701 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1998)).
289 OFFICE OF THE U.S. SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 427.
290 Id.
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But the MHPA was limited in a number of important ways. It was
inapplicable to "[c]ompanies with fewer than 50 employees" or compa-
nies that do not offer mental health benefits.291 "The parity provisions
did not apply to other forms of benefit limits, such as per episode limits
on length of stay or visit limits, or copayments or deductibles, and they
did not include substance abuse treatment. '292 Further, the MHPA of-
fered an exemption to those insurers whose parity implementation efforts
resulted in more than a one percent rise in premium.2 93
Most state efforts at implementing parity legislation have closely
resembled those at the federal level. Texas' legislation, for instance, is
narrow in scope, including only people with severe mental disorders and
focusing only on state employees. 294 Maryland's scope is slightly
broader, focusing on a wider range of insured populations and including,
in some cases, substance abuse.295 The overwhelming scope and serious
implications of the issue at hand, coupled with various states' failures to
achieve the extent of parity required, makes clear the fact that federal
legislation is necessary. This note proposes federal legislation substan-
tially similar to the ADA, with several major exceptions.
2. Proposed new legislation
First, while the proposed legislation would have a safe-harbor provi-
sion for insurance companies, such provision would not be subject to
liberal construction, as it has been under the ADA.296 Therefore, the
legislation should state that all decisions regarding scope of coverage
would have to be based on sound actuarial data. Otherwise, the insur-
ance companies would be invited, as they have previously been, to make
their decisions according to the societal stigma associated with mental
illness. Hard-nosed oversight of the insurance industry will necessarily
see private employers' compliance.
Second, the proposed legislation must mandate parity across-the-
board. The burden of proof will rest solely on the insurer that any dispa-
rate treatment of disabilities is based on truly sound actuarial data.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See id. at 428.
295 See id.
296 See Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 18; see also Doe, 179 F.3d at 564 ("It is one thing to say
that an insurance company may not refuse to deal with disabled persons; the prohibition of
such refusals can probably be administered with relatively little interference with state insur-
ance regulation .... It is another thing to require federal courts to determine whether limita-
tions on coverage are actuarially sound ...."); Ford, 145 F.3d at 612 (construing § 501(c) to
mandate underwriting based on sound actuarial principles would "require insurers to justify
their coverage plans in [federal] court after a mere allegation by a plaintiff," thereby effecting
a "seismic shift in the insurance business").
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While a case-by-case evaluation of the soundness of actuarial data must
focus on cost to some extent, cost alone cannot be determinative unless
the estimated cost of parity will likely ruin the insurance industry.
Third, the proposed regulation must reserve a separate clause dedi-
cated to the issue of mental health care coverage, so that there is no room
for questioning congressional intent to actually, as opposed to purport-
edly, even the disability playing field. It is not enough that the mentally
ill have health care coverage identical to their non-mentally ill "peers."
They must have access to mental health care that equals their and others'
access to physical health care.
Finally, unlike the MHPA, the proposed legislation will not exempt
companies according to their number of employees. Similarly, the new
legislation, instead of exempting companies that offer no mental health
benefits at all, will mandate that all employers offering any kind of
health care coverage whatsoever provide mental health care coverage as
well, including coverage for substance abuse. The parity provisions will
apply to all forms of benefit limits, such as per episode limits, limits on
length of stay, visit limits, co-payments and deductibles. Lastly, no rise
in premium felt by insurers, as a result of implementing parity, will con-
stitute a permissible basis on which to exercise an exemption.
If the above proposal sounds extreme, it is only because our society
has come to accept the notion that certain disabling illnesses are more
legitimate, and therefore more deserving of treatment, than others. In
actuality, there is nothing extreme about requiring the insurance industry
and employers to base their life-altering decisions regarding health care
benefits on fact rather than fiction. When sixty-one percent of Ameri-
cans receive the majority of their health care coverage from private em-
ployer-provided insurance plans, 297 it is imperative that such plans
reflect reality. Mental illness is reality.
CONCLUSION
Does a disparity in health care insurance between mental and physi-
cal disabilities "adversely [affect an employee's] employment opportuni-
ties?"2 98 Most definitely, yes. And yet such a disparity has not only not
been prohibited under the ADA, it has actually been encouraged by legis-
lative and judicial interpretations of the ADA. A House Report released
in 1990 stated that the purpose of the ADA was, in part, "to bring indi-
viduals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life."'299 One look at the startling figures regarding economic
297 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 195, at 415, Table 6-3.
298 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5.
299 H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 99 (1990).
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expenditures on mental health care in Part IV, specifically those regard-
ing patient out-of-pocket expenditures, severely challenges the validity
of that statement. Particularly in a time when appropriate treatment can
alleviate, if not cure, mental illness symptoms and disability, there is no
reasonable excuse for such disparity.
Presently, the large majority of those in need of mental health treat-
ment do not seek it.300 The stigma surrounding mental illness is alive
and well and serves to deter people from seeking effective treatment. "It
gives insurers - in the public sector as well as the private - tacit per-
mission to restrict coverage for mental health services in ways that would
not be tolerated for other illnesses."' 30' Scientific research into the
sources of mental disabilities has attempted, with limited success, to dis-
card societal misconceptions and stereotypes associated with mental ill-
ness. However, that mental illness remains, in large part, shrouded in
fear and misunderstanding, is evidenced by the ADA's arguably narrow
scope, the federal courts' restrictive interpretations of federal legislation,
and various states' half-hearted attempts at creating "parity" legislation
of their own.
As the Surgeon General recently declared, the federal government
must, once and for all, "place mental illness treatment in the mainstream
of health care services. ' 30 2 The ADA did not achieve that purpose. "The
goals of the ADA - for equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency - are beginning to shape
our national culture. '30 3 But we have a long way to go before they are
truly realized, particularly with respect to mental health care coverage in
the private employment realm. Implementation of federal legislation that
does justice to the mental health care crisis described above is essential.
300 OFFICE OF THE SUGEON GEN., supra note 199, at 415.
301 Id. at 454.
302 Id. at 458.
303 NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 29.
